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As the United States and other nations 
push for the signing of a Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty, representatives are meeting in Ge­
neva this year to develop an International 
Seismic Monitoring System to verify compli­
ance with the treaty's restrictions. In addition 
to the official monitoring system, regional net­
works developed for earthquake studies and 
basic research can provide a strong deterrent 
against clandestine testing. The recent release 
of information by the U.S. Department of En­
ergy (DoE) on previously unannounced nu­
clear tests provides an opportunity to assess 
the ability of multi-use seismic networks to 
help monitor nuclear testing across the globe. 
Here we look at the extent to which the 
formerly unannounced tests were recorded 
and identified on the basis of publicly avail­
able seismographic data recorded by five 
seismic networks. The data were recorded by 
networks in southern Nevada and northern 
California at stations less than 1500 km from 
the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and two net­
works in the former Soviet Union at stations 
farther than 1500 km from the NTS. 
With the exception of some of the Soviet 
stations, none of the networks analyzed were 
charged with monitoring the NTS. These net­
works, however, detected 85% of all unan-
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nounced tests performed underground at the 
NTS, and 73% were listed in open seismic 
catalogues prior to the DoE announcement. 
Soviet stations, at epicentral distances as 
great as 10,000 km from the test site, identi­
fied all unannounced tests with an estimated 
magnitude of 4 or larger. U.S. networks, lo­
cated at regional distances, detected 89% of 
all tests since 1983, and these tests had seis­
mic magnitudes between 1.4 and 4.5. 
While this study should not be regarded 
as a comprehensive evaluation of the moni­
toring capability of seismic stations, it does 
demonstrate the increasing capability of 
multi-use seismic stations and networks to de­
tect and identify small seismic events. This ca­
pability will be useful for monitoring once an 
international Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is 
signed. 
Seismic Event Detection at the 
Nevada Test Site 
Since December 1993, the DoE has re­
leased information on 204 unannounced nu­
clear tests performed underground at the 
Nevada Test Site (NTS). The information on 
each test included its date and time, the test 
area, the depth of burial, and a yield range. 
The NTS was established in 1951 and is lo­
cated in the Basin and Range province, a re­
gion that is marked by high seismicity with 
earthquakes at shallow depths (Figure 1). In 
this tectonic setting, the most difficult task of 
identifying a nuclear test is to discriminate 
the event against regional earthquakes. Large 
seismic events at the NTS are generally re­
corded by enough seismic stations and with 
a sufficient signal-to-noise ratio to allow the 
identification of the event on the basis of dis­
tinct signal characteristics. Furthermore, rela­
tively few earthquakes occur each year 
within the general area of the NTS with mag­
nitudes larger than two or three (Figure 1) 
[Gomberg, 1991; Gawthrop and Can, 1988]. 
DoE's policy is to only report the yield of 
announced tests as either less than 20 kT or 
20-150 kT [U.S. Congress, 1989]. With a few 
exceptions, two tests in 1970 and 1973, all of 
the previously unannounced tests were re­
ported to have yields below 20 kT and may 
have been quite small. 
The detection and identification of small 
seismic events at the NTS can be difficult. 
Small events are likely to be recorded by 
only a few stations, and the recordings often 
show poor signal-to-noise ratios, making 
such events difficult to detect and identify. 
Unfortunately, at the same time, several hun­
dred earthquakes with magnitudes smaller 
than two are detected at the NTS each year 
(Figure 1). 
Several facts can help in identifying nu­
clear tests at the NTS. First, the geographic 
boundaries of the relatively small areas used 
for testing are well known. Second, relatively 
few earthquakes with magnitudes above 2 or 
3 occur within the NTS region despite the 
relatively high seismicity. Finally, most nu­
clear tests are performed at depths less than 
600 m while most earthquakes in this region 
occur at depths greater than 5-8 km. Conse­
quently, in the routine analysis of seismic 
data, regional and teleseismic networks gen­
erally designate a detected seismic event as a 
nuclear test at the NTS if the event can be 
conclusively located at shallow depth within 
the relatively small regions used for testing. 
NTS Explosions Recorded at 
Regional Distances 
The ability of regional networks to detect 
small, unannounced tests at the NTS is dem­
onstrated using data from the following three 
networks established to monitor regional tec­
tonic processes along the San Andreas Fault 
System and across the Basin and Range prov­
ince: the Southern California Seismographic 
Network (SCSN), run jointly by the California 
Institute of Technology and the United States 
Geological Survey; the Southern Great Basin 
Seismographic Network (SGBSN), operated 
by the United States Geological Survey prior 
to 1992; and the Western Great Basin Seismo­
graphic Network (WGBSN), operated by the 
University of Nevada at Reno. 
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f/g. 7. Earthquake epicenter locations for the year 1982 for a region centered around the Nevada 
Test Site (in red). The Southern Great Basin Seismographic Network recorded 945 events (black 
dots) in its bulletin. Of these, 331 events had local magnitudes (ML) between 1 and 2; 43 events 
had ML between 2 and 3; and two events had ML above 3. Events listed in the National Earth­
quake Information Center Bulletin (white dots) include one event located in the northeast part 
of the test site. This event was interpreted as an earthquake with magnitude (mb) 3.2 and oc­
curred on December 12, 1982, at a depth of 15 km. Original color image appears at the back of 
this volume. 
As mentioned earlier, none of these net­
works had the specific task of monitoring the 
NTS for testing activity, nor were they de­
signed for that purpose. During the first dec­
ade of unannounced nuclear testing at the 
NTS, the SCSN was operating four single-com­
ponent stations along the California/Nevada 
border with the closest station approximately 
200 km from the test site. By 1986, the SCSN 
had increased its station density in this re­
gion to 12 stations. The SGBSN and WGBSN, 
initially installed in the late 1970s and 1960s, 
respectively, reached a station density of ap­
proximately 100 mostly single-component 
high-frequency seismic stations deployed 
within a radius of 300 km of the test site in the 
early 1980s. 
Over the three decades examined, the re­
gional networks included in this study used 
two distinctly different procedures to detect 
and catalog seismic events. The SCSN moni­
tored all seismic activity using continuous 
analog recordings. Analysts routinely exam­
ined the SCSN recordings to detect, identify 
and catalog seismic events of interest. The 
SGBSN and the WGBSN relied mostly on auto­
matic event detection. To detect and declare 
a preliminary event, these networks required 
three or more stations to automatically trig­
ger the recording of the event, which analysts 
would then identify and catalog. 
Prior to the DoE's disclosure, U.S. regional 
networks independently detected 73% (148) 
of all previously unannounced nuclear tests 
(Figure 2) . These tests were listed at the time 
of their occurrence in the open bulletins of 
the networks. Since 1983, when unan­
nounced nuclear testing resumed after a 3-
year period during which all tests were 
announced, regional networks inde­
pendently detected 89% (16 of 18) of all un­
announced tests. 
The smallest signals detected were those 
from a test on December 9,1988, with a local 
magnitude of 1.6, and one test on August 14, 
1985, with a local magnitude of 1.4. Although 
these tests were extremely small, they were re­
corded by enough instruments to identify 
them within the boundaries of the approxi­
mately 500 km 2 NTS Yucca Flat test area. The 
location estimate for the 1988 test was within 
1.3 km of the drillhole and 300 m of the true 
burial depth. 
After the DoE disclosure of the test detona­
tion times, the total number of detected unan­
nounced tests reached 85% when the 
reexamination of the continuously recorded 
seismic data at the SCSN revealed evidence 
of 25 additional tests that were not listed 
in the bulletins of the networks at the 
time they occurred (Figure 2 ) . Of these 25 
tests, 21 had been performed in the 1960s 
and four in the 1970s. While the smallest 
tests listed in the bulletins during this 
time period had magnitudes between 3.0 
and 3.5, the smallest tests detected after the 
DoE announcement had magnitudes of 
about 2.2. 
Surprisingly, some of these tests were esti­
mated to have magnitudes above 2.6, the 
threshold magnitude for the SCSN to discrimi­
nate events at the NTS. These relatively large 
tests may have been recorded by SCSN sta­
tions, but not listed in their bulletins due to 
the strictly scientific focus of the network. 
The detection of nuclear tests was not con­
sidered important during such times of fre­
quent testing, and therefore nuclear tests 
were often excluded from the earthquake 
bulletins. 
No evidence was found in the archived 
SCSN records to confirm about 15% of the pre­
viously unannounced tests at the NTS. Most 
of the undetected tests were conducted dur­
ing the 1960s and 1970s. Only two tests con­
ducted since the early 1980s remain 
seismically undetected: one on September 
29,1983, and another on October 30,1985 
(Figure 2) . When these tests were detonated, 
the SGBSN, with a detection threshold of less 
than magnitude 1 for events located on the 
test site, had only one or two stations de­
ployed near the test area. Since the tests were 
not detected, it is likely that they were ex­
tremely small, with magnitudes below the 
SGBSN detection threshold, and that their 
yields were equivalent to no more than a few 
tens of tons [Richards and Zavales, 1996; Mur­
phy, 1981]. 
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Fig. 2. Histogram of204previously unannounced tests performed underground at the Nevada Test Site. 
Prior to the DoE's announcement of the tests, 73% (149 of204) were detected and are listed in open 
seismological bulletins. The rate of detection increased to 89% (16 of 18) for tests conducted since 1983. 
After the DoE announcement, the number of all tests seismically detected from 1963 onward increased 
to 85% (173 of204). 
Overall, 31 tests could not be confirmed in 
this study. This number may decrease as addi­
tional data become available. However, some 
U.S. nuclear tests had zero yields, which can­
not be detected seismically. This may account 
for at least a few of the unannounced tests. 
Zero yield tests, however, are not of great con­
cern to monitoring efforts aimed at uncovering 
a clandestine nuclear weapons design 
program. 
NTS Explosions Recorded at 
Teleseismic Distances 
At teleseismic distances (larger than 1500 
km), monitoring at the NTS is strongly de­
pendent on ray path; and at distances several 
thousand kilometers from the NTS test site, 
the ability of stations and networks to detect 
small tests varies significantly. The following 
analysis is based on data from two networks 
in the former Soviet Union (FSU) that were 
operated by the Complex Seismological Ex­
pedition (CSE) of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences' Institute of the Physics of the Earth 
and its Institute of the Dynamics of the 
Geosphere (IDG). 
These networks were initially installed to 
monitor global and regional seismicity, to 
provide high-quality seismic data for re­
search on local microseismic noise condi­
tions, and to monitor nuclear explosions. 
Between 1961 and 1990, IDG and CSE oper­
ated more than 160 seismic stations and ar­
rays throughout the FSU, many of which were 
equipped with three-component, broadband 
channels as well as narrowband vertical 
channels. 
Over several decades of monitoring, some 
IDG and CSE stations showed high sensitivity 
to events at the NTS. For those stations, the 
epicentral distances to the NTS vary from 
about 5000 km for station Iul'tin in eastern Rus­
sia to about 10,000 km for stations Borovoye 
and Zerenda in Northern Kazakhstan (Figure 
3). Despite the great distance from the NTS, 
Northern Kazakhstan is known to be a superior 
location for monitoring the test site because of 
low seismic attenuation for ray paths from the 
NTS and the very low microseismic noise levels 
[Richards etai, 1992; Adushkin and An, 1990]. 
The capability of station Borovoye in 
Northern Kazakhstan to monitor the NTS is il­
lustrated in Figure 3 (inset), in which the un-
filtered seismograms of two unannounced 
tests detonated at the NTS in the early 1970s 
are shown. One test on October 14,1971, had 
an explosive yield of less than 20 kT. Another 
on June 21,1973, was one of the two unan­
nounced tests with a yield above 20 kT. In 
spite of their low yields, 36% of all of the un­
announced tests at the NTS were detected 
and identified by stations within the FSU. So­
viet stations have detected 61 % of all unde­
clared tests conducted at NTS since 1983. 
The majority of the tests were recorded by sta­
tions in Northern Kazakhstan. 
While the identification of detected events 
on the basis of location and signal charac­
teristics led to the misidentification of only one 
test, magnitude estimates derived from differ­
ent stations within the networks vary signifi­
cantly. No simple relationship could be 
observed for body wave magnitude values 
(mb) obtained from IDG/CSE stations and local 
magnitude values ( M L ) obtained from U.S. re­
gional networks. Magnitude estimates derived 
by the IDG deviate from those of the SCSN by 
values of - 0.2 to -F0.7. Magnitudes derived from 
stations in Northern Kazakhstan vary by up to 
0.7 units. 
To allow a direct comparison between 
events detected at teleseismic and regional 
distances, we assigned magnitude values de­
rived by the SCSN to all tests detected by 
IDG and CSE. Three tests with magnitudes 
smaller than M L 3.5 were detected by Soviet 
Fig. 3. Location map of teleseismic stations most sensitive to events at the Nevada Test Site. Solid circles 
denote teleseismic stations: ILT, Iultin; SEY, Seymchan; T1K, Tiksi; YAK, Yakutsk; and YLT, Yel'tsovka; 
star denotes Borovoye (BRV) and Zerenda (ZRN) in Northern Kazakhstan; open triangle denotes Nevada 
Test Site (NTS). Minor arcs indicate shortest distances between the NTS and seismic stations. Distances 
to the Nevada Test Site increase from about 5,000 km for station Iul'tin in eastern Russia to about 10,000 
km for stations Borovoye and Zerenda in Northern Kazakhstan. (Inset) Two previously unannounced 
tests as recorded by station Borovoye in Northern Kazakhstan with magnitude estimates (M\) as 
determined by the Southern California Seismographic Network. 
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F/g. 4. Capability of former Soviet Union (FSU) stations to detect nuclear tests at the Nevada Test 
Site. Magnitude values (ML) were taken from Southern California Seismographic Network cata­
logues, and assigned to tests detected by the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of the Dy­
namics of the Geosphere and Complex Seismological Expedition. All tests with ML 4.0 or greater 
were detected and identified as nuclear tests by FSU stations. 
stations (Figure 4) . With 95% probability, 
these stations detected unannounced nu­
clear tests at the NTS with magnitudes be­
tween M L 3.9 and 4.0. This finding confirms 
threshold magnitudes derived from an­
nounced tests for station Borovoye 
[Adushkin and An, 1993]. All unannounced 
tests with M L 4.0 or greater were inde­
pendently detected and identified as nu­
clear tests by stations within the former 
Soviet Union. 
Conclusions and Implications for 
Nuclear Monitoring 
The analysis of the unannounced tests 
clearly demonstrates the value of multi-use 
seismic stations as a strong deterrent to clan­
destine nuclear weapons testing. Any nation 
attempting a secret nuclear weapons test 
would have to take into account not only the 
formal treaty monitoring network, but also 
the increasing number of multi-use seismo­
graphic networks that are being deployed 
around the world. 
At teleseismic distances, the capabilities 
of these networks might be as low as magni­
tude 4 or below, as indicated by the capabil­
ity of the Russian networks to monitor 
nuclear explosions at the Nevada Test Site. 
A magnitude 4 seismic event corresponds 
roughly to a 1-kiloton nuclear weapon test. 
If stations exist within regional distances, 
the capability might be further reduced 
below magnitude 2, as indicated by the 
capability of the western U.S. networks to 
detect events at the Nevada Test Site. A de­
tection threshold below magnitude 2 would 
preclude the likelihood of a tamped explo­
sion of even a few tons going undetected. 
No matter what system is developed for 
the routine monitoring of a CTBT, additional 
resources will exist for most areas of the 
world that can contribute to the monitoring 
task. As the United States and other nations 
negotiate a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 
the strong deterrence value of existing multi­
ple-use seismographic networks should be 
recognized and provisions should be incor­
porated within the treaty to encourage open 
access to the data from such networks. 
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Observations Suggest Earth's Inner Core 
Spins Faster Than the Earth Itself 
PAGES 289-290 
The inner core and the rest of the Earth 
are perpetually racing one another, and it 
seems the inner core is winning by a stun­
ning distance. This proposition, once wholly 
abstract and theoretical, now has firm 
grounding in quantifiable observation. 
That the solid inner core of Earth should 
rotate—and faster than its surroundings— 
has been suspected, modeled, and postu­
lated for about a decade, but never verified. 
Now two seismologists from the Lamont-Do-
herty Earth Observatory, Xiaodong Song and 
Paul Richards, have announced that seis­
mological records provide the evidence geo-
physicists need to confirm that the inner core 
is spinning. 
According to Song and Richards, the 
Earth's innermost core rotates in the same di­
rection as the rest of the planet, but slightly 
faster. The researchers have calculated that 
in one day the inner core spins about two-
thirds of a second faster than its surround­
ings. Therefore, in a year, a given point on 
the surface of the core turns almost 19 km fur­
ther than a point on the surface of the crust. 
Such movement is about 100,000 times faster 
than the drift of the continents, and it means 
that the core essentially laps the Earth by a 
complete revolution every 400 years. In the 
past century of seismological measurements, 
the core has gained about a quarter turn on 
the whole planet, Song and Richards found. 
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Fig. I. Earthquake epicenter locations for the year 1982 fora region centered around the Nevada 
Test Site (in red). The Southern Great Basin Seismographic Network recorded 945 events (black 
dots) in its bulletin. Of these, 331 events had local magnitudes (MtJ between J and 2; 43 events 
had ML between 2 and 3; and two events had MLobove 3. Events listed in the National Earth­
quake Information Center Bulletin (white dots) include one event located in the northeast part 
of the test site. This event was interpreted as an earthquake with magnitude (mu) 3.2 and oc­
curred on December 12, J 982, at a depth of 15 km. 
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